Old versus new security. A contribution to the conceptual debate*
1. The problem

Traditionally, scientific progress results from questioning the theoretical, methodological, and conceptual status quo, from introducing new phenomena into the catalogue of empirical analyses, and from re-evaluating the validity, the fruitfulness, and the surplus in substance and approach of these new ideas. Within this process the conceptual debate plays a special role in operationalising or translating theories into analysis. As long as sciences in general and social sciences in particular understand themselves not only as critical towards the issue but towards the theories, methods, and concepts as well, the cause of innovation – political demand, intellectual fashions, or scientific curiosity – is of secondary importance. Security or war-and-peace studies, which traditionally constitute an essential part of European and non-European state sciences and philosophies, have been objected to such dynamics as well. One of the recent trends in this area of social sciences or International Relations is its conceptual broadening or the introduction of the “new” against the “old” security. Putting aside objectives to attract new funding, to overcome research monopolies and protectionism of the established academic security community, or to re-establish influence in the political decision-making as well as generate to new public attention and support, this trend is both legitimate in its intention to innovate as well as to be scrutinised, whether, how, and how far its promises produce real progress or scientific surplus. In reference to dialectical processes and longstanding traditions of scientific dispute the following argumentation understands the new-versus-old-dispute not only as defining the new as better by itself or because its claims to be better or more progressive but as to verifying/falsifying this message. In order to do so the different interpretations of new security are measured or compared to the conceptual essentials of the old security concept in order to find out the resulting conceptual added-value. The following argumentation is conservative - i.e. argues that new security in its different variations and definitions does not create adequate new overall conceptual value but de-focusses the concept of security and allows political escapism regarding political important essentials of the old security concept. The basic message consists of three interrelated statements: that the conceptual broadening of the security concept does not translate in adequate research surplus, that it puts the necessary differentiation in analytical focussing aside, and that traditional or “old” analytical approaches produce better, i.e. more reliable and valid scientific results and political imperatives.

1 Classical contributions are for example Thukydides’ Peleponnesian War, Julius Caesar’s Bellum Gallicum, Niccolo Macchiavelli’s Principe, Sun Tsu’s About war, Immanuel Kant’s Eternal peace, and Clausewitz’s About the war.
But before going into details it seems necessary and legitimate to discount the singularity of this new trend. In general both the academic and political debate about the understanding of security have undergone numerous cycles of innovation, contraction, and extension – in particular after World War II. The emergence of nuclear weapons, the East-West arms race, and the development of nuclear deterrence strategies have promoted a conceptual debate, in which security was primarily viewed as military security, as to be controlled by arms control and related policies, and shaped by realism and neo-realism. The period of détente revitalised not only a multidimensional definition of security but introduced the debate about peace-insecurity based on idealism in general and a the translation of the re-emerging normativism from social sciences into security, conflict, and peace research. The dissolution of the East-West conflict as the major issue for security, conflict, and peace studies not only questioned the political necessity and the legitimacy of military alliances such as NATO but downgraded both the political as well as the academic relevance of such studies, which then could not define themselves as dealing with the ultimate survival of mankind. Loosing attractiveness, understanding itself as a metascience, and revitalising its idealistic background, peace and conflict research looked for new issues to maintain or re-establish political and academic legitimacy. Basically, the search for new security related itself to four types of issues:

First, it opened security up to new issues such as the North-South conflict and development studies and a broader understanding of security. Traditional Third-World-romanticism² and
–projectionism³ of European intellectuals, the continued debate between de-colonial and past and present colonialising countries and the related activities within the U.N. system⁴, and the new conceptualisation of development aid together with the globalisation of the international⁵ agenda made this to a politically attractive issues, demanding academic expertise and consulting.

Second, old and new non-military threats such as pan-/epidemics, meteorites, and terrorism were taken into account. While such threats and particularly the related public anxieties have been a traditional subject of the political agenda both the globalised media reporting as well feelings towards a more global community revitalised and populised such issues.

Third, structural threats such as environmental ones were defined as additional new security problems of a global kind and with particular catastrophic alarmism.

Fourth, introducing the concept of human security or redefining traditional socio-economic issues as security problems further widened both the range of empirical analysis as well as of the conception debate on security.

But again – for the sake of the scientific dispute the undifferentiated and unreflected widening of the concept seems unnecessary; the theoretical and methodological improvement of the traditional or “old” conceptional approaches seems more appropriate to generate scientific progress. To prove this hypothesis, the following consists of two steps: first the summary of

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² For example in the glorification of Ho Chi Min in Europe.
³ For example in the Che Guevara myth or the spread of Maoism in Europe.
⁴ Here the new initiatives to move things through global commissions such as the Brandt-, Palme-, and Brundtland-Commission have to be remembered, see The Commission on Global Governance 1995.
⁵ The activities and doctrines of the Socialist International illustrate this.
the essential conceptual characteristics of old security and second the question, how and how much new security fits, widen, and deepen these essentials.

2. The political framework of old security

In reference to the contract theory the modern nation-state has two basic principles, when it comes to security. First, it is the nation-state, who provides security - both against external and internal threats - towards its society as a whole, to its groups, sections, subregions, and to the individual citizens. In order to do so and as a result from the social contract, the nation-state has the monopoly for security instruments such as police and the military for providing adequate security services. This follows the basic idea of the modern social contract in its most consequent way - i.e. to create on the one side a strong state, able and willing to provide security services, and on the other side to establish comprehensive political control. Second, the nation-states differentiates between external and internal security services both in terms of instrumentation as well as in terms of principles. The fundamental and farreaching separation of capabilities - i.e. the police and internal security apparatus on the one side and the military on the other side - results not only from the different quality and reach of the intra- and the international order - but from the historical experience of military dictatorship as the worst variation of a non-democratic political system.

This has led to a political framework for the nation-state's security services, which is characterised by four essentials:

First, the state's uncompromised monopoly for security services in general and its instrumentalisation through the military and police in particular.

Second, a fundamentally different organisation or separation of the forces necessary for the external and internal security threats plus a coherent mechanism for its political control.

Third, and in addition to the principle of the separation of forces or of the "divide-and-rule"- doctrine the principle of non-redundant hierarchical state leadership particularly in the case of the military to create an able and effective military power projection capability.

Fourth, a special status for arms industry as a necessary condition for autonomous military capabilities.

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6 To abandon private military and to replace it by state-military was a major point in the creation of the modern nation-state and resulted from negative experience with private armies in terms of costs, political control, and dependencies. In addition, this allowed to introduction of conscription, mass armies, etc. The existence of marginal private soldiers or private military agencies or the hiring of non-national soldiers - such as the Ghurkas for the British army - is irrelevant in terms of quality and quantity.

7 Of course there are politically strictly controlled exceptions from the rule in case of emergencies, catastrophes, etc., when the police and related capacities are not able to manage the problem.

8 While arms industries have often been state industries to ensure fullest political control, even the privatisation of arms industries - for example in the EU - has kept special rules and mechanisms for procurement etc., which differ from civilian market rules. In addition, arms exports are mostly controlled by the specific governments and follow patterns fundamentally different from exports of non-military goods and services.
Comparing the nation-state's political organisation of security with the state's services for economic growth and social welfare as another basic service of the state illustrates the relevance of these essentials. In fundamental difference to security or the military, economics are organised on market or mixed models, work on the principle of competition, redundancy, and relative independence from government control, and follow a pattern of globalisation, which arms economics never can and want to achieve. And although these above principles are primarily a matter of the construction of the state's security service, they nevertheless condition the general security concept as well as its specific operationalisation. Thus, the conceptual debate cannot ignore such a political framework; if it does, it ignores both historical experience, basic principles of the construction of the modern state, and the essentials of contract theory including the theory of the democratic nation-state.

3. The concept of old security

3.1. Military security

The classical concept of security as military security, which dominated the conceptual debate during the East-West conflict as well as numerous past and present conflicts, is based on three essentials, which reflect and refer to the essentials of realism:

1. Military security policy is by its very nature a monopoly of the sovereign nation-state and its governancing. Nation-states, however, can seek multilateral and integrative alliances as a power- and security-multiplying strategy.

2. It follows a negative approach: military security is security against other nation-states with the ability to threaten the integrity of national territory, to limit or even control the nation-state’s foreign behaviour, and to intervenes into the nation-state’s independent defining, setting, and conducting its specific political identity, organisation, etc. Negative means in addition to understand regional and global relations as a zero-sum-game; the gains of one nation-state are other nation-states’ losses.

3. Within this negative approach security analysis focuses on threats and understands military threats as the most dangerous and therefore as primary threats. Military threats are defined as the product of military capability – or more precise the ability to project military power against somebody – times political will to make use of the military capability to force a nation-state into obedience, etc. Such threat projection options result from the amount times the probability of effective damage under reference of one’s own damage limitation capabilities. And nuclear weapons from a certain quantity and quality onwards constitute not only threats targeted to specific nation-state or groupings but as a consequence of intentional or unintentional horizontal and/or vertical escalation a universal threat to mankind.

3.2. Security in peace

While after and because of the Cuban missile crisis the U.S.-Soviet détente only supplemented the traditional concept of security by nuclear bipolarity and arms control, the European détente process developed gradually a fundamental new understanding of European
security. While NATO’s new Harmel doctrine redefined security as the result of defence and détente, the German détente concept as well as its implementation through the new Ostpolitik since the end of the 60’s revolutionarised security thinking and constituted a necessary but not sufficient condition and cause for the later dissolution of the East-West conflict. Three new essentials were of special relevance for redefining security policies and transforming traditional security analysis to security-, conflict-, and peace research.

1. In contrast to the traditional negative understanding of security-against-security the new idea of common security introduced a positive doctrine of common interest both above those of nation-states – such as the need for global survival vis-à-vis the dangers of a nuclear all-out-war - and between conflicting nation-states – such as a common interest in controlling and reducing economic costs and risks of the arms race. In reference to gradualism common security interests should be introduced besides existing confrontative interests and gradually widened and deepened replacing the principle of the zero-sum-game through a surplus-creating-game.

2. While the security concept of the Cold-War-period defined security as military security, both NATO’s new doctrine as well as Germany's détente policy harmonised with EC and NATO and implemented both through multiple bilateralism as well as through CSCE-multilateralism can be regarded as the repolitisation of the security concept. Introducing the dimensionality-thinking meant to define security as the outcome of a grand strategy, which optimise activities in the political-diplomatic, the economic, and the military dimension of security. In addition and as a sort of supplement to the dimensionalisation of security, détente policy rediscovered non-

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9 It has to be remembered that the term European détente means a limited geopolitical understanding of détente as a process between Western and Eastern Europe as well as between both Europe’s and the USSR. The global dimension of détente and/or Soviet behaviour – and this was the centerpoint of the dispute between the U.S. and its European allies in the end of the 70’s – was ignored by the Europeans but became one of the main points of the U.S. agenda.

10 Without going into the details of the dispute about the causes of the end of the East-West conflict, European détente cooperation is considered as one and confrontative U.S. armament policies during the first Reagan administration as the second major development causing the fundamental reorientation of Soviet security and defence policies under Gorbachev.

11 This has to be understood against the background that Western and Eastern European nation-states defined the reduction from or the limitation of security dependencies from the bloc-leaders – U.S. and USSR – as a basic common interest to be promoted by détente, the CSCE process, and closer political cooperation.

12 Here, on can refer to the argument that the economic costs of the old security doctrine – in the West about 3-7 % of GNP and in the USSR up to 20 % of GNP – did not adequately translate into surplus in security.

13 Realistic European war scenarios expected from the outbreak of a major war unacceptable damage and losses and an equally unacceptable risk of horizontal and vertical nuclear escalation.

14 Although the interelation to the principles of European integration is limited the basic idea resembles positive experiences from common-interest-building in Western Europe after 1945.

15 Although looking back the détente concept seems comprehensive, coherent, and with a grand political logic, one has to remember that this concept was developed gradually over the years. For example, the complementation of multiple bilateral détente through the CSCE process was not conceptualised from the very beginning, when CSCE was regarded not as a complement but only a supplement. However, it belongs to the conceptual intelligence of the responsible actors to quickly understand the perspectives of CSCE and then to upgrade the role of CSCE from a supplement to a complement.

16 Again, this was done in a gradual way. Detente started with political-diplomatic détente - i.e. mainly treaties and related activities - continued with economic cooperation, and aimed at military-confidence-building, then arms control, and finally disarmament as basic elements of military détente. Aiming at cross-dimensional spillover effects and at the creation of a dynamic, in which cooperative détente would gradually reduce confrontative deterrence and arms races, the final concept was coherent in conceptual terms but failed for nearly two decades to motivate the USSR to move from military confidence-building to real arms control and finally disarmament in Europe. It was the Gorbachev administration, which finally and fundamentally introduced political change in Soviet security policies.
governmental policies to create domestic as well as transnational public support for the new understanding of security.\footnote{Both bilateral détente and in particular the CSCE process with its agreements on cultural exchange, press freedom, etc. intended to develop, stimulate, and support transnational cooperation of NGO's and the public as well as an intranational process of public support for détente and foreign policy change. Although the direct political impact of CSCE-groups in Eastern Europe, peace movements in Western Europe and the GDR, and - for example - trade union support for political change in Poland had been limited, such groups and movements nevertheless prepared the broad political support and demand for political change in Eastern Europe and the USSR as well as the end of the East-West conflict.}

3. Conceptually equally important was the redefinition of the interrelation of security and peace. While traditionally security concepts were dominated by realistic and peace concepts by idealistic thinking and competed against each other as falcons-versus-doves both conceptually as well as politically, détente introduced the concept of peace-in-security. The politisation of security, the idea of common security, and the promise that détente would not only strengthen non-military conflict management and prevention but would gradually reduce and eventually overcome the burdens and risks of the military confrontation opened security thinking for ideas of gradual pacification or peace-building. Conceptually more important, however, was the revitalisation of the debate about the concept of peace. Introducing the definition of peace as both a negative - i.e. reducing military threats - as well as a positive concept - i.e. creating mechanisms, institutions, and structures to prevent military solutions of conflicts - eliminated the conceptual as well as the political competition between security and peace. The promise of harmonising security and peace was not only important to seek political change and the end of the East-West conflict but proved to be politically successful\footnote{While the naive idea of a major peace-dividend and the comprehensive demilitarisation of international relations ignored both realities and dynamics of the post-East-West-conflict-Europe and the international system, the positive effects of the elimination of the mutual East-West-threat-syndrom have been significant in economic, political, and democratisation/ transformation terms.}. Thus, national interest in reducing military burdens and risks in a sustainable perspective and norms or the ideal of a peaceful world with its significant mobilising and civic-society-building effect were not only harmonised but reinforced each other.

\subsection*{3.3. Security through better global governance}

While the call for an equally wide and deep reform of the U.N. system in general, its institutions, and its regimes such as the NPT, CTB, sensitive arms export, etc. did not fully materialise, the end of the East-West conflict together with the transformation of a bipolar towards a multipolar international system based on economic developments in various parts of the world as well as the European integration and peace-in-security-building process allowed and stimulated two further conceptual additions in security thinking.

1. The new East-West consensus together with a more critical evaluation of a fundamentalistic interpretation of national sovereignty not only revitalised the replacement of "sovereignty" by "limited sovereignty" but allowed its translation into various U.N. politics. Introducing the concept of limited sovereignty has to be regarded as in direct relation to the idea of better global governance. From a conceptual viewpoint better global governance carries three implications: first the idea that global governance is a political necessity as well as a feasibility, second the idea that global governance has and can be improved as well as oriented to norms or the
ideal of betterness, and third that this altogether means a redefinition of the global system not as a nation-state-only system but as a system, in which the nation-states relate each other to a common global interest in political control and/or governance, however selective, limited, and inefficient this might be in the beginning.

2. While particularly in the area of security against military nuclear threats and nuclear malevolence the concept of better global governance through limited sovereignty lead only to marginal improvements, it progressed in the area of conventional peace-keeping. Limited sovereignty allowed to widen and deepen peace-keeping into active and even preventive peace-making - eventually in dissens or against the will of the targeted nation-state - and peace-keeping operations turned from a supplement to a major issue in the international political agenda by developing the idea of global military policing or better and effective global security governance. Conceptually, the introduction of policing means that peace-making is a legitimate service from a whatever-organised global government, semi-, or substitutional government based on the legitimacy of common global coercive action against the malevolent nation-state, which threatens global peace.

The latest addition to the understanding of old security is the incorporation of transnational, well-organised, and aggressive terrorism - for example of the Taliban type. Although in traditional legal terms the prevention, management, and solution of terrorist activities falls into the competence of police and internal domestic security the changed nature - the amount, intensity, and globalisation of threats - of some terroristic organisation and their close relations to quasi-state-structures - allows both conceptually as well as politically to define such terrorism as a military security threat to be controlled not only by traditional policing but by military measures and in military ways - such as in Afghanistan - as well. Therefore, this kind of terrorism can be considered not as a new but as a part of the old security threat concept.

4. Searching for the conceptual added-value of new security concepts

4.1. North-South and development

Analysing the advantages and disadvantages of broadening this concept of security through the North-South and development conflict leads to the following results:

- The North-South conflict is of a fundamental different nature than the East-West conflict and therefore comparing both conflicts or analysing the North-South conflict along the lines of the above understanding of military security do not result in constructive research in principle. Due to its economic-political dimension, the development and the good-governance-problem the North-South conflict is far lesser governmental and state-monopoly-influenced than for example the East-West conflict and its underlying security concept. Although the North-South conflict might translate into a military security problem, the size, quality, and relevant know-how of military threat capabilities developing countries – even combined – are marginal and their nuclear potentials do not constitute the kind of threat within the East-West conflict.

- In addition, the political condition for managing and solving the North-South conflict are equally fundamental different: the North-South including the development
challenge needs combined efforts between states, economic actors, and the civil society actors, instead of separation of forces it needs a coherent integration of forces into one grand strategy, it has to be based on controlled multiple redundancies, and its economic actors have to follow normal market conditions and dynamics in order to produce effective progress.

- Like in the case of military security it needs alliance-building but not of an as-much-as-integrative-as-possible but more of a multilateral type, which means to reserve national sovereignty. Like in the case of military security, however, the solution of the problems lies in the combination of will and capability but in contrast to military security the creation of public support for will-building is significantly more difficult and demands other approaches than those in the military security case.

- In terms of common interests the North-South and development issue share the approach of the old security thinking; the problem and its solution must be understood both from a value and interest community approach, but needs fundamental different and more demanding political consensus than the military problems. A multidimensional as well as a combined governmental-civic society approach is even more needed than in the military and the new concept of positive peace demands the political and economic integration of developing and semi-developed countries in the new global community.

- Although the North-South and development issue is a fundamental issue of globalisation and global governance, necessary conditions for solving the security dilemma and creating effective peace such as limited sovereignty as well as models developed for peace-keeping/making are not only unfeasible but do not apply for an effective solution of the problem.

From an analytical viewpoint both the general fundamental differences of the North-South and development towards the old security problem as well as the conceptual divergences do not allow to simply widen the old concept but recommend to continue the analysis with the existing traditional and eventually specifically new innovative concepts. This does not exclude to deal with the military security dimension in the development issue as well as the development issue in the global security debate in general and in the peace-keeping/making discussion in particular. Thus, is seems more adequate to keep the different conceptual approaches but to look for spill-over dynamics in the case or class analysis. From a political viewpoint, however, things are and should be different: peace and development are traditionally paired in the global political agenda, development demands intranational, intraregional, and international peace, and the idea of better global governance is valid not only vis-a-vis the security dilemma but the development or North-South community issue as well. While integrating the development issue into the conceptual security debate seems politically attractive or fashionable, its overall conceptual added-value is not only none and its implicit dangers of conceptual simplification considerably high.

4.2. Catastrophic disasters

Analysing the advantages and disadvantages of broadening this concept of security through the issue of catastrophic threats and disasters such as meteorite-earth collisions, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis etc. leads to the following results:
• Catastrophes of a major local, a regional, or of a global kind differ in its origin but produce comparable effects to wars or military interventions. Meteorite-earth collisions lead to similar effects like nuclear explosions but without radiation, major volcanic eruptions cause similar winter effects, and earthquakes can lead to major infrastructural collapse as well. Although different in nature the effects of such catastrophes can cause major human losses, collapse of material and social infrastructure, and can affect climate, agricultural production, and human life.

• From a certain magnitude onwards the management of such catastrophes follows the political conditions of the concept of old security. Magnitude times necessity to act quickly demand state control or a de facto state monopoly in organizing solutions and assistance, demand non-redundant hierarchical management but in contrast to old security not a separation but a close coordination and even an integrated set of instruments.

• Both the prevention and the management of the results go often beyond well-established mechanisms and means of nation-states; although prevention of such catastrophes is currently limited, the negative approach towards such threats are legitimate and necessary and the equation of political will, ability, and capability is comparable to old security threats.

• Common-interest-building depends primarily of the magnitude, the geographical reach, and the amount of long-term threats such as climate change. However, the effects of modern media assist in short-term common solutions or the creation of a global-community-thinking and -acting. As it has been mentioned above, catastrophes from a certain magnitude and reach demand from the very beginning a multi-dimensional as well as a combined governmental-civic society approach like in the old security concept. But given the limited probability, the cumulative different experiences, and the limits in preventive and even immediate control the structural imperative of the peace-in-security approach of the old security concept applies to catastrophes only in a limited extent.

• Although major catastrophes constitute a fundamental issue of globalisation and global governance, necessary conditions for new structures such as introduction of limited sovereignty are less relevant while models, structures, and practices of peace-keeping/making do apply for an effective solution of the problem.

Although nature and causes of major catastrophes as less man-made but more following natural laws there effects and the existing models and experiences allow them to be treated not as a traditional old security threat but as a supplementary problem, which effects allow its incorporation in the concept of old security threats, if one takes the political-will- and rationality factor into account. But such a widening of the old security concept has to carry the important implication to carefully observe the different causes of catastrophes and military threats, the fundamental differences in its political control and consequences for the political order both intra- as well as internationally. While in principle and due to the specific nature of catastrophes it might be better to treat them separately both in conceptual and political term, there exist some arguments to interrelate them and eventually to integrate them into a concept of grand multiple threats - but with only a limited conceptual added-value.
4.3. Health and environment

Parallel to the catastrophes advocates of the new security concept propose to include health and environment problems again of a certain magnitude and geographical scope in the security agenda.

But to treat health and environmental problems differently and separate them from the above-discussed catastrophes seems on the one side legitimate by its different nature, its man-made causes, and its structural character and follows on the other side traditional patterns of prevention, management, and solution, which differ from those in the case of catastrophes.

- Public health and environment issues follow on the one side the specific logics of natural sciences and on the other side the political, socio-economic, and cultural logic of societies and nation-states. This dual nature demands in analysis and solution to combine both logics and to develop a coherent explanation and a combined political strategy. This differs fundamentally from the conceptual understanding of old security.

- With the exception of nuclear winter, biological warfare, mass mining, and other special effects of wars, the man-made causes of health and environmental problems follow a fundamentally different logic than military security threats. Even the related human losses and threats to material and social infrastructure, and human life in general carry different characters than those caused by military means.

- Although from a certain magnitude onwards the management of health and environmental actual disasters and structural threats demand the strong state with a monopoly for crisis control and solution. But if it comes to prevention and long-term solution the necessity for state monopoly and non-redundant hierarchy wane, because the solution demand a much more combined governmental-public cooperation than in any military case.

- Both the prevention and the management of the results go often beyond well-established mechanisms and means of nation-states and demand a considerable amount of international cooperation and even global governance - but in difference to peace-keeping on the base of constructive and non-coercive consensus. While logics of war, arms races, and deterrence relate to national sovereignty, national identity, and power health and environmental problems allow a much greater cost-benefit-risk rationality because of their different nature and the different instrumentalisation of prevention, management, and solution. Thus, common-interest-building - but on a multilateral or traditional way - seems politically easier, if traditional zero-sum-game-calculation is gradually replaced by international-community thinking. However, both political will-building and capability to solve the actual and structural problems follow fundamental different intra- and international patterns than the ones of overcoming old security threats.

In sum, nature and causes of the health and environmental problems differ from those of catastrophes and carry a major man-made element, which in principle opens possibilities and options for adequate prevention and early solution. But this man-made rationalities differ both in quality, instrumentation, and political reach fundamentally from those, which cause old security problems. And while this speaks against incorporating them in a widened security concept the political consequences of defining such issues as security issues might lead to its domination by military thinking, military actors, and military approaches to its solution, which one the one hand downgrades its political relevance and on the other side distorts
solution policies. Thus the traditional division of labour seems both conceptual as well as political recommendable - there is no major added value in subordinating these issues under a widened - but still militarily dominated - security agenda.

4.4. Human security

Human security can be defined through focussing on the socio-economic conditions of individual life, through a spectrum of different good-living-factors such as fulfilment of basic needs and its complements, of adequate public services from law-and-order to social welfare, etc., and finally in terms of an overall concept of matching the realities of all aspects of individual and collective life with the given possibilities, abilities, and capabilities. It both refers to the human- or basic-rights-debate within or in addition to the theories of democracy as well as a comprehensive enlightened understanding of the good state, good governance, or best-possible civic society.

The advocates of the concept of human security as a new security issue can first refer to the legitimacy and acceptance principle and objectives mechanisms of modern nation-states, in which a negative perception of human security leads to the withdraw of public support for a government, a regime, and finally a political system and a positive perception translates into general public and specific electoral support. A second way of reference lies in analysing subjective security needs of individual and collective bodies, in which socio-economic security - i.e. a secure job, income, and social position and secured public law and order - normally rank highest in the public threat agenda.

There are three arguments against not only to use the concept of human security instead of the traditional concepts including that of a broad and comprehensive understanding of human rights and good governance but as well as in incorporating such a human security in a generalised security concept.

- Human security is oriented to positive development and uses negative developments only in a bad-reference argumentation. While old security thinking starts and ends with the negative notion to realise a maximum in the absence of military threat, human security thinks positively in promoting better conditions, constellations, and structures.

- Given the still-existing role of the nation-state towards such objectives - human security is primarily an intra-national and not an international matter as old security. Of course, it can refer to improvement of regional and global structures to realise human security in a geographically broader space, but in its essence it targets the national government and the national elites and refers to the incentive and sanction mechanism of public support and elections.

- Finally, the political actors of human security are not only other but in their political organisation and role fundamentally different actors. Labour movements and the military perceive and act not only in different ways but have basically different sources of and access to power.

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19 The reform policies of Gorbachev in the USSR and of Deng Xiao Ping are recent examples for the political effects of loss or gains in such human security.
Thus, both the need as well as the pay-off of defining the issues under human security as issues to be covered by a generalised concept of new and broad security is even less convincing than the previous new security issues. In addition, the extremely broad nature of human security, makes precise and to-the-point analysis and recommendation within the existing old security thinking and acting not only too difficult but as well simply unproductive.

5. Summary and outlook

Although each summary implies an element of simplification or de-differentiation it nevertheless seems helpful to answer the initial question about the fruitfulness of enlarging the conceptual debate with new security issues in listing possibilities and limitations for the different aspects, which have been discussed above. The overall result of this scheme is indeed that there some similarities and conceptual parallels between old and some new security issues:

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<td>Security-in-peace</td>
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<td>- Dimensionalisation</td>
<td>+++</td>
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<td>- security-in-peace</td>
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<td>Security through better global governance</td>
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<td>- limited sovereignty</td>
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<tr>
<td>- peace-keeping/making</td>
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While thus in some aspects, new security issues show comparable and sometimes similar conceptual approaches as old security issues, the analytical problem of the different nature of old and new security issues constitutes an important argument against the conceptual widening. As it has been outlined above, military threats, which constitute the essence of old security, are of man-made causes, have nothing to do with nature, God, or eternal-universal laws, and therefore can be overcome by political developments, agreements, etc. - whether this is reached through a global social contract, through gradual improvement of global governance, or any other strategies. Ignoring this by focussing on the phenomenological
approach, in which for example catastrophes, mass epidemics, major environmental disasters etc. produce comparable or even similar losses, leads to invalid results. Military threats are of a unique nature, are caused by unique factors and constellations, and develop their own and unique patterns and dynamics.

But the look at the academic aspect of incorporating new security issues in the old security studies would be incomplete without a reference to the political organisation of sciences. There is no doubt that old security studies traditionally attracted and attract major public attention and elite interest - understandably wars, military interventions, and nuclear proliferation rate high in media, public opinion, and political debate. And in countries such as the U.S. this attention translated in funding of research, institutional prestige, and general attractiveness - whether from and for the "falcons" or the "doves". Therefore it is explainable that disciplines with lesser popular attention and support seek the umbrella of security studies to participate from the privileged status. However understandable such need for publicity and funding support is, the history of science have proven how much dangerous, distortive, and misleading such needs can become for substantial analysis and theory-building.

Finally, a further warning or reservation has to be issued against the widening of the security concept, which origins from the traditional policy-orientation of the all the variations of old security studies - defence and military, conflict, peace, and security-in-peace studies. All these studies together with the general political priority-building have established a particular political decision-making pattern as well as political agenda-setting in terms of military security as well as prevention, management, and solution of military threats, interventions, and wars. Despite all shortcomings, this has led in the last decades to major political progress in terms of disarmament, control of nuclear proliferation, and peace-keeping/making, which have to be secured, enlarged, and intensified. Broadening the security concept might lead to the political generalisation of security management, in which the different security threats compete for institutional support, funding, and political attention, which eventually might downgrade the relevance of military threats. And without ignoring the importance of the development challenge, the catastrophic, health, and environmental threats and finally the necessity to improve living conditions in all aspects and globally, still the effective control and better the overcoming of military threat - or the old security challenges - are in terms of human and budgetary costs, military risks, and uncontrollable escalation dynamics has to be regarded as of highest political relevance - even in periods and regions, which have not suffered from wars, military interventions, and nuclear threats. In global terms the probability-times-damage-formula of military or militarised conflicts shows still the highest scores of costs and risks. Thus, the old understanding that peace - and in particular negative peace or the complete and assured absence of military threats - is not everything but everything - and in particular best-possible living conditions with development, good health, protection of the environment etc. - is nothing without peace-in-security is still valid and should be observed as a guideline for social or state sciences in particular.

In sum and despite the fact that in some categories and some issues conceptual similarities and parallels exist, which might seduce the researcher to open-up the conceptual debate or to widen the old security concept through supplementary analytical spill-over effects, the overall differences between the old security concept and the new security issues are by far too wide and deep and the dangers of compromising in terms of analytical focussing and critical political to-the-point approach are too big. Thus, it seems more appropriate to continue with a division of labour in the conceptual approaches - but in a closer cooperation in terms of analytical results and political recommendations based on mutual recognition of differences of
the issues but the common interest in improving global social affairs and mankind's living conditions.

References


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